feat(web): Gitea OIDC auth, signed session, allowlist (W5)
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@@ -1,12 +1,15 @@
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"""FastAPI application factory for the read-only web dashboard (W4).
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"""FastAPI application factory for the web dashboard (W4 read-only + W5 auth).
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**In-process only**: routes call ``operations/`` + ``backends.load_backend``
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directly and render Jinja2 templates. They never shell out to the CLI (see
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``CLAUDE.md`` / the web-UI plan's architecture rules).
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**No auth in this step** (that is W5) -- the app binds ``127.0.0.1`` by
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default via :class:`~ci_orchestrator.config.WebConfig`; ``create_app`` itself
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never chooses the bind address, that is ``commands/web.py``'s job.
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**Auth (W5)**: the four data routes below are protected by
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:func:`~ci_orchestrator.web.auth.require_user`. Auth is ACTIVE iff
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``config.web.oidc is not None``; when inactive (the W4 default -- bare
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localhost dev), ``require_user`` is a no-op and these routes behave exactly
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as in W4. ``create_app`` itself never chooses the bind address, that is
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``commands/web.py``'s job.
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**Backend may be unavailable**: :func:`get_backend` is a FastAPI dependency
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that swallows :class:`~ci_orchestrator.backends.errors.BackendError` (raised
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@@ -29,6 +32,7 @@ from ci_orchestrator.backends.errors import BackendError
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from ci_orchestrator.operations.cache import CacheStatus, cargo_cache_status
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from ci_orchestrator.operations.host import DiskStatus, RunnerStatus, disk_status, runner_status
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from ci_orchestrator.operations.vms import LiveVm, list_live_vms
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from ci_orchestrator.web.auth import configure_auth, require_user
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if TYPE_CHECKING: # pragma: no cover
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from ci_orchestrator.backends.protocol import VmBackend
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@@ -156,11 +160,16 @@ def host_partial(request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
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def create_app(config: Config) -> FastAPI:
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"""Build the read-only dashboard app.
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"""Build the dashboard app.
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W4 scope: no auth, read-only routes only. Binding to a concrete address
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(always ``127.0.0.1`` by default -- never ``0.0.0.0``) is
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Read-only routes only (mutating actions are W6). Binding to a concrete
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address (always ``127.0.0.1`` by default -- never ``0.0.0.0``) is
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``commands/web.py``'s job, not this factory's.
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All data routes are guarded by ``require_user`` (W5): when
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``config.web.oidc is None`` that dependency is a no-op (open mode, W4
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parity); when set, unauthenticated requests redirect to ``/login``.
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``/healthz`` and ``/static`` stay unprotected either way.
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"""
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app = FastAPI(title="ci-orchestrator web")
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app.state.config = config
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@@ -168,10 +177,22 @@ def create_app(config: Config) -> FastAPI:
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app.mount("/static", StaticFiles(directory=str(_WEB_DIR / "static")), name="static")
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app.get("/healthz")(healthz)
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app.get("/", response_class=HTMLResponse)(dashboard)
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app.get("/vms", response_class=HTMLResponse)(vms_partial)
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app.get("/cache", response_class=HTMLResponse)(cache_partial)
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app.get("/host", response_class=HTMLResponse)(host_partial)
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app.get("/", response_class=HTMLResponse, dependencies=[Depends(require_user)])(dashboard)
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app.get("/vms", response_class=HTMLResponse, dependencies=[Depends(require_user)])(
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vms_partial
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)
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app.get("/cache", response_class=HTMLResponse, dependencies=[Depends(require_user)])(
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cache_partial
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)
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app.get("/host", response_class=HTMLResponse, dependencies=[Depends(require_user)])(
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host_partial
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)
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# SessionMiddleware (needed by the OAuth flow's state/nonce) is added
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# here, before the app is ever handed to a server -- Starlette builds
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# the middleware stack lazily on first request, so this is safe
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# regardless of where the route registrations above sit.
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configure_auth(app, config)
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return app
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@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
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"""Gitea OIDC authentication for the web dashboard (W5, SECURITY-CRITICAL).
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**Auth is ACTIVE iff ``config.web.oidc is not None``.** When inactive (the
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W4 default -- bare localhost dev), :func:`configure_auth` is a no-op and
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:func:`require_user` degrades to a no-op that returns ``"anonymous"``; this
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preserves the W4 open-localhost dashboard exactly. When active,
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``SessionMiddleware`` (itsdangerous-signed cookies) is installed, an Authlib
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OAuth client is registered against Gitea's OIDC discovery document, and
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``/login`` / ``/auth/callback`` / ``/logout`` are wired in.
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**Secrets come from the OS keyring only** -- the session signing key
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(``config.web.session_secret_cred``) and the OIDC client secret
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(``config.web.oidc.client_secret_cred``) are keyring key *names* in
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``Config``/TOML, never the secret values themselves (see
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``credentials.KeyringCredentialStore``). Never log, template, or put a
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secret value into an error message -- only the keyring key *name* may ever
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appear in diagnostics.
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**Allowlist is fail-closed.** After a successful OIDC login the username is
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checked against ``config.web.allowed_users``; an *empty* allowlist denies
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everyone (misconfiguration must never mean "allow all").
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any
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from authlib.integrations.starlette_client import OAuth
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from fastapi import FastAPI, HTTPException, Request
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from fastapi.responses import RedirectResponse
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from starlette import status
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from starlette.middleware.sessions import SessionMiddleware
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from ci_orchestrator.credentials import KeyringCredentialStore
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if TYPE_CHECKING: # pragma: no cover
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from ci_orchestrator.config import Config
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#: Userinfo claims checked, in priority order, to derive the login username.
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_USERNAME_CLAIMS = ("preferred_username", "login", "username")
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def _read_secret(cred_name: str) -> str:
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"""Read a secret from the OS keyring by key *name* -- NEVER from TOML.
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Raises :class:`RuntimeError` naming only the missing keyring key
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*name* (never a value) if the lookup fails, so nothing sensitive ever
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reaches a log line or an error page.
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"""
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try:
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return KeyringCredentialStore().get(cred_name).password
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except KeyError as exc:
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raise RuntimeError(
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f"keyring key '{cred_name}' not found -- run `ci creds set {cred_name}`."
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) from exc
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def require_user(request: Request) -> str:
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"""FastAPI dependency guarding a route behind a valid signed session.
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Auth is ACTIVE iff ``config.web.oidc is not None`` (see
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:func:`configure_auth`). When auth is **inactive** this is a no-op that
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returns ``"anonymous"`` -- the W4 open-localhost dashboard keeps working
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unmodified. When **active**, a request with no ``user`` in the signed
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session is redirected (303) to ``/login`` rather than rejected outright
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-- 403 is reserved for "authenticated but not on the allowlist" (see
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:func:`auth_callback`), never for "not logged in yet".
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"""
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config: Config = request.app.state.config
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if config.web.oidc is None:
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return "anonymous"
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user = request.session.get("user")
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if not user:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_303_SEE_OTHER,
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headers={"Location": "/login"},
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)
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return str(user)
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def register_oauth(config: Config) -> OAuth:
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"""Build an Authlib ``OAuth`` registry with the ``gitea`` client registered.
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Uses OIDC discovery (``{issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration``).
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Authlib fetches that document lazily on first use (inside
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``authorize_redirect``/``authorize_access_token``), never at
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registration time -- calling this function alone never touches the
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network.
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"""
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oidc = config.web.oidc
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if oidc is None:
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raise RuntimeError("register_oauth requires config.web.oidc to be set")
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oauth = OAuth()
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oauth.register(
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name="gitea",
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server_metadata_url=f"{oidc.issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration",
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client_id=oidc.client_id,
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client_secret=_read_secret(oidc.client_secret_cred),
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client_kwargs={"scope": " ".join(oidc.scopes)},
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)
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return oauth
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def _extract_username(claims: dict[str, Any]) -> str | None:
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"""Pick a username out of OIDC userinfo claims, Gitea-first."""
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for key in _USERNAME_CLAIMS:
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value = claims.get(key)
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if value:
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return str(value)
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return None
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async def login(request: Request) -> Any:
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"""``GET /login`` -- redirect to Gitea's OIDC authorize endpoint.
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Authlib stores the CSRF ``state`` (and OIDC ``nonce``) in the signed
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session itself, so ``SessionMiddleware`` must already be installed
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(guaranteed: this route only exists when :func:`configure_auth` added
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it, which is exactly when the middleware was also added).
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"""
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config: Config = request.app.state.config
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oauth: OAuth = request.app.state.oauth
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assert config.web.oidc is not None # route only registered when active
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result: Any = await oauth.gitea.authorize_redirect(
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request, redirect_uri=config.web.oidc.redirect_url
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)
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return result
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async def auth_callback(request: Request) -> RedirectResponse:
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"""``GET /auth/callback`` -- exchange the code, allowlist-check, set session.
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Authlib validates the OIDC ``state``/``nonce`` against the session as
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part of ``authorize_access_token`` (CSRF protection on the flow) -- that
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validation is never bypassed here.
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**Fail-closed allowlist**: any username not found in
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``config.web.allowed_users`` (including when that list is empty) gets a
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plain ``403`` and no session is ever created. The keyring-sourced
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secrets and the raw token are never included in the response.
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"""
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config: Config = request.app.state.config
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oauth: OAuth = request.app.state.oauth
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assert config.web.oidc is not None # route only registered when active
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token: dict[str, Any] = await oauth.gitea.authorize_access_token(request)
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userinfo: dict[str, Any] | None = token.get("userinfo")
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if not userinfo:
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userinfo = await oauth.gitea.userinfo(token=token)
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username = _extract_username(dict(userinfo or {}))
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if not username or username not in config.web.allowed_users:
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail="user not authorized"
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)
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request.session["user"] = username
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return RedirectResponse("/", status_code=status.HTTP_303_SEE_OTHER)
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async def logout(request: Request) -> RedirectResponse:
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"""``GET /logout`` -- clear the signed session and send the user to ``/login``."""
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request.session.clear()
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return RedirectResponse("/login", status_code=status.HTTP_303_SEE_OTHER)
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def configure_auth(app: FastAPI, config: Config) -> None:
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"""Wire OIDC auth into ``app`` iff ``config.web.oidc`` is set.
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Inactive (``config.web.oidc is None``): no-op, open mode (W4 parity) --
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``require_user`` alone handles that case and the login routes are never
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registered.
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Active: adds ``SessionMiddleware`` *before* anything OAuth-related runs
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(Authlib needs the session for state/nonce), registers the OAuth client
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on ``app.state.oauth``, and registers ``/login``, ``/auth/callback``,
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``/logout``.
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"""
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if config.web.oidc is None:
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return
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# https_only=False: this host serves plain HTTP on the LAN (no TLS
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# termination in front of it, see the web-UI plan's gotchas) -- forcing
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# https_only=True here would make the browser silently drop the session
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# cookie and break every login. same_site="lax" still blocks the cookie
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# being sent on cross-site requests; the cookie is httponly by
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# SessionMiddleware's own default (unconditional, not toggled by
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# https_only).
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app.add_middleware(
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SessionMiddleware,
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secret_key=_read_secret(config.web.session_secret_cred),
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same_site="lax",
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https_only=False,
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)
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app.state.oauth = register_oauth(config)
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app.add_api_route("/login", login, methods=["GET"])
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app.add_api_route("/auth/callback", auth_callback, methods=["GET"])
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app.add_api_route("/logout", logout, methods=["GET"])
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__all__ = [
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"auth_callback",
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"configure_auth",
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"login",
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"logout",
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"register_oauth",
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"require_user",
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]
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