Adds a "Show" selector (10 / 25 / 50 / 100) to the card header and drops the
default row count from 15 to 10. The chosen value rides on the card's own
polling URL (`/executions?limit=N`), so it survives the 5s htmx refresh with no
client-side state; a config default outside those four is rendered as an extra
option instead of disappearing. The query is parsed permissively — a stale or
hand-edited polling URL clamps or falls back to the config default rather than
422-ing a card that would otherwise render.
Ordering is now explicit rather than inherited from whatever Gitea returns:
newest first, a not-yet-started (queued) run above everything, ties broken on
Gitea's run id so matrix runs sharing a timestamp keep a stable order.
The dashboard could only show what was powered on this instant, so it could
not answer "did the last build pass?" — and no local execution history exists
to answer it from (`report job` reads a PowerShell-era JSONL path that nothing
writes on this host, and the recent artifact dirs are empty).
Recent runs now come from Gitea's Actions API (`operations/executions.py`):
`/api/v1/admin/actions/runs` for every repo on the instance, falling back to
`/api/v1/user/actions/runs` when the token is not admin-scoped. One list call
per refresh, cached 10s, so the card's 5s htmx poll costs Gitea at most one
call per window. Live VMs are grouped under the run that spawned them — the
job id is `{run_id}-{run_attempt}[-suffix]` and the clone name carries it — so
a matrix run collects several VMs on one row. Every failure mode (no token,
401, unreachable Gitea, malformed payload) degrades to a notice plus the plain
VM rows, each keeping its Remove button, so the card is never less useful than
the table it replaces. Orphans stay where they were: the sweep in Maintenance,
the count in the status-header tile.
Auth reuses the access token from the operator's own OIDC login, which
`auth.py` previously discarded. SECURITY: that token is kept server-side only
(`app.state.gitea_tokens`, dropped on logout) and never written into the
session — `SessionMiddleware` signs the session cookie but does not encrypt
it, and this service is deployed over plain HTTP on the LAN, so a bearer token
in there would be readable in the browser and on the wire. An expired token is
refreshed once; `[web] gitea_token_cred` names an optional keyring PAT for the
cases a login token cannot cover (service restart, non-admin operator).
`GET /vms` and `partials/vms.html` are gone; `POST /vms/{id}/remove` and
`POST /vms/cleanup` are untouched.
Design: docs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-25-executions-card-design.md
Adds operations/services.py: a fixed ManagedService allow-list (act-runner, act-runner-rust, vmware-host, ci-web) with find_service/service_states/control_service. control_service builds an argument list only (never shell=True), validates the action against ALLOWED_ACTIONS (ValueError->400), refuses stop on restart-only services (ci-web, allow_stop=False) without building a command, and defers ci-web's own restart via 'sudo -n systemd-run --on-active=2 systemctl restart ci-web.service' so the HTTP response returns first.
Route POST /services/{service_id}/{action} in web/routes.py mirrors vms_remove: require_user + require_csrf + two-step confirm gate + one audit entry per stage; unknown id / bad action / disallowed-stop short-circuit to 400 before any subprocess or audit; the vmware-host confirm step warns with the active-VM count. New /services read partial with state-aware Start/Stop/Restart buttons, polled every 15s.
deploy/sudoers.d/ci-web grants ci-runner exact-command NOPASSWD for exactly these nine systemctl lines plus the systemd-run deferral — no wildcards, no bare systemctl, no ci-web stop; setup-web-linux.sh installs it mode 0440 and validates with 'visudo -cf', rolling back on failure. Config gains [web].managed_services override; docs/WEB-UI.md documents the panel + security model.
Gates: 1044 tests pass (46 new security/unit tests), coverage 94.20%, ruff + mypy --strict clean. Not yet deployed: sudoers install + prod-venv reinstall + ci-web restart are a human privilege-boundary step.
Default on, because the cache is safe by construction rather than by
convention: it engages only where a Cargo.lock exists, and refuses to publish
anything the prune assertion cannot vouch for. Two independent off switches --
the flag for one job, `enabled = false` for the host.
The store root is resolved after the environment overrides are applied, so
CI_ROOT relocates it along with everything else, while an explicit root in the
config still wins. Both directions are covered by tests.
Also asserts that the Windows branch never receives the argument at all: the
cache is Linux-only and the two branches stay separate, per AGENTS.md.
Eliminates VMware-Tools IP-detect polling (observed: 39–177 s variance on
Linux host B7 benchmark). When [ip_pool] is configured the orchestrator:
1. Allocates a slot IP from a JSON-backed pool (fcntl-locked on Linux)
2. Injects guestinfo.ip-assignment / netmask / gateway into the cloned VMX
before vmrun start
3. Skips _wait_for_ip entirely — uses the pre-assigned IP immediately
4. Releases the slot in _destroy_clone (all paths: success/failure/interrupt)
New modules / changes:
src/ci_orchestrator/ip_pool.py IpSlotPool + _file_lock context manager
src/ci_orchestrator/config.py IpPoolConfig dataclass; [ip_pool] TOML
src/ci_orchestrator/commands/job.py _inject_guestinfo_ip helper; pool wiring
tests/python/test_ip_pool.py 12 unit tests (acquire/release/persist)
tests/python/test_config.py ip_pool config parsing tests
tests/python/test_commands_job.py pool path + _inject_guestinfo_ip tests
config.example.toml [ip_pool] section (commented example)
Coverage 90.02%; mypy --strict clean.
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